security-audit-v3 #15. download_file already had a verify branch; no caller
used it and every *_SHA256 in versions.sh was a commented placeholder, so a
tampered mirror tarball flowed straight into configure/make and the shipped
WASM.
- versions.sh: 13 pins (cross-checked against Homebrew/Buildroot/nixpkgs/
FreeBSD/vcpkg/boost.org/curl PGP; glm .zip is TOFU), boost/curl/libgit2
versions moved beside their pins.
- all 13 download_file call sites pass "${NAME_SHA256}".
- download_file refuses an empty or malformed pin (PCBJAM_ALLOW_UNPINNED=1
to bootstrap a new dep); file_sha256 prefers sha256sum, falls back to shasum.
- scripts/deps/check-pins.sh: static 3-arg check + offline file:// enforcement
test; runs in wasm-build.yml before the deps cache, on cache hits too.
Expect one cold --build-deps run: the deps-cache key hashes versions.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GcsgJZ77bhZatLAVU8R84H
f6b0aaf122